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In the original papers by Alkemade et al. (2006, 2007), their evolutionary algorithms
(EAs) exhibited an extreme degree of premature convergence when they were run
according to approach I. This seemed a quite curious result. We are happy that the
correction (Alkemade et al. 2008) makes clear that the degree of premature conver-
gence is much lower than originally reported. There are three further comments that
we would like to make on the work of Alkemade et al.
First, Alkemade et al. state that “convergence behavior differs for different values
of the EA parameters such as initial density and chromosome length”. We would like
to emphasize that the behavior of an EA depends on the initial density parameter only
in the short run. In the long run, the initial density parameter has no effect on the
behavior of an EA. This is because from a mathematical point of view an EA (or, more
precisely, a genetic algorithm) is an ergodic Markov chain (e.g., Nix and Vose 1992;
Dawid 1996). In the long run, the state of such a Markov chain no longer depends on
the initial state. We agree with Alkemade et al. that the behavior of an EA depends
on the chromosome length. This is the case not only in the short run but also in the
long run. Since the chromosome length is a technical parameter that usually does not
have a clear economic interpretation, we regard the dependence of EA behavior on
the chromosome length as a disadvantage of the use of EAs for economic modeling.
Second, Alkemade et al. point out that two popular approaches to the use of EAs for
economic modeling can yield quite different results. This is a very interesting obser-
vation, especially since earlier studies usually simply took one of the two approaches
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without giving any motivation. We believe that the insights provided by Alkemade
et al. are useful not only in the field of agent-based computational economics but also
in the field of evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game theory, researchers use
the same two approaches that are distinguished by Alkemade et al. That is, researchers
either assume that the number of evolving strategies equals the number of players in
the game being studied (approach I; e.g., Vega-Redondo 1997) or they assume that the
number of evolving strategies exceeds the number of players and that strategies are
randomly matched to play the game (approach II; e.g., Kandori et al. 1993; Weibull
1995). The insights provided by Alkemade et al. suggest, for example, that the result of
Vega-Redondo (1997), who finds that evolution leads to the Walrasian equilibrium in
Cournot oligopoly games, may change if approach II rather than approach I is adopted.
Third, Alkemade et al. argue that approach II is preferable over approach I because
the latter approach exhibits premature convergence. We take a different point of view.
In our opinion, there are two reasons why approach II need not be preferable over
approach I. The first reason is that in the context of economic modeling premature
convergence of an EA is not necessarily something undesirable. We believe that the
use of EAs for economic modeling needs to be supported by empirical evidence or by
evidence from laboratory experiments (e.g., Arifovic 1994; Duffy 2006). From this
perspective, whether approach I or approach II is preferable is an empirical issue and
depends on the economic problem being modeled. It may be that some problems can
best be modeled using approach I while other problems can best be modeled using
approach II. The premature convergence observed under approach I may for exam-
ple be useful for modeling problems characterized by path dependence (e.g., Arthur
1994). The second reason why approach II need not be preferable over approach I
has to do with the specific type of EA that was used by Alkemade et al., namely
a genetic algorithm with a binary encoding. We believe that the premature conver-
gence observed by Alkemade et al. under approach I depends crucially on their use
of a binary encoding. When we replicated the simulations of Alkemade et al. using
an evolution strategy (e.g., Beyer 2001), which is a type of EA that does not rely
on a binary encoding, we did not observe any premature convergence at all under
approach I.
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